The effects of wage dispersion on productive efficiency is a topic rich in theoretical conjecture, a common object of Scandinavian polemical debate and at the same time an issue almost barren of systematic econometric evidence. The Swedish record of enormous compression of relative wages under the institutional regime of centralized solidarity bargaining, followed by substantial de-compression of wages after central bargaining broke down, supplies observations well suited for empirical testing of theories and assertions about the response of productive efficiency to shifts in wage distribution. Results presented in this paper obtained from regression experiments based on distribution-augmented production and labor productivity functions yield no support of 'fairness, morale and cohesiveness' theories implying that wage leveling within workplaces and industries may enhance productivity. We do find substantial evidence, however, that reduction of inter-industry wage differentials contributed positively to aggregate output and productivity growth, most likely for the structural reasons first emphasized by leading Swedish trade union economists almost a half century ago.
relative wages declined by a whopping 75 percent. 5 At the inequality trough in 1983, the Swedish hourly wage distribution was = σ , the ratio of the variance and squared mean of individual wages. When Between Industry and Between Plant variances are weighted by the respective employment shares, as in Figure 1 and ahead, the Total CV 2 is decomposable, Industry dispersion and (B) indexes Between Plant or Between Industry dispersion. Micro wage and dispersion data for white-collar workers are much less comprehensive than the data for blue-collar workers, but union-induced compressions of white-collar wages were most likely of comparable magnitude. See Hibbs (1990) . For sources and additional information, see Appendix, Record of Notation.
so dense that a relative wage increase of only around 30 percent was enough to carry a worker from the lowest decile of the blue-collar distribution all the way to the highest. By comparison, in the same period a parallel move across the blue-collar hourly wage distribution in the United Kingdom would have required a relative increase of more than 200 percent and for a US manufacturing employee the requisite increase was over 400 percent. 6 The effects of wage distribution on productive efficiency is a topic rich in theoretical conjecture, has been the object of vigorous Scandinavian polemical debate, and yet at the same time is an issue almost barren of systematic econometric evidence. One provocative body of theoretical literature, prominently associated with the work of Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990) and Levine (1991) , departs from traditional neoclassical thinking by proposing that within-firm wage distributions more compressed than initial condition productivity differentials may yield more harmonious labor relations, greater employee effort, and hence higher average output per worker. By contrast, a common supposition among those familiar with the Swedish experience is that the leveling of wage differentials across skill groups within work places was for the most part imposed by strong central unions on reluctant employers, creating large productivity-diminishing distortions of microeconomic incentives. (Flam, 1987 , Lundberg, 1985 , Myrdal, 1991 On the other hand, almost a half century ago, leading Swedish trade union economists of the day argued that central union wage policies aimed at squeezing pay differentials between industries and plants could enhance productive efficiency by speeding up the movement of labor and capital from low to high productivity activities (Rehn and Meidner in Turvey, ed., 1952) ; a point reinforced in a more formal manner by subsequent theoretical demonstrations (Agell and Lommerud, 1993, Moene and Wallerstein, 1997 ) and empirical analyses of intersectoral resource flows (Edin and Topel, 1997) .
The Swedish record of enormous wage compression under the institutional regime of centralized solidarity bargaining, followed by substantial de-compression of relative wages after central bargaining broke down, provides data well suited to empirical testing of these and related ideas about the response of productive efficiency to shifts in wage distribution. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part 2 gives a brief history of postwar Swedish industrial relations, which identifies three distinct phases of the wage formation process that instruct specification and interpretation of the empirical models to follow. Part 3 presents stylized facts about output and labor productivity performance and introduces distributionaugmented theoretical models of production, upon which estimating equations are based. Part 4 reports estimation results and discusses their implications for theories linking productive efficiency to wage distribution. Part 5 concludes by calibrating the cumulative effects of wage dispersions --Between plants and industries, Within plants and industries, and Totally --on aggregate output and labor productivity growth in Swedish industry.
A Brief History of Postwar Swedish Wage Formation
The concept of a centrally coordinated, "solidarity" wage policy in Sweden evidently was first voiced at the 1936 LO congress by the Metal-workers union as a mechanism for leveling wages across the entire labor force in order to make feasible wage equalization within their own industry. (Meidner, 1974; Swenson, 1991) Right from the start SAF also took a leading role in promoting the development of national bargaining, because large-scale manufacturing firms comprising SAF's most important constituency believed that centralization would inhibit wage pressure from powerful unions in sheltered sectors from 6 The computations are documented in Hibbs, 1990 . Broader samples of international data on individual and inter-industry relative wages also show Sweden to have had exceptionally low wage dispersion by the late 1970's which cannot be accounted for by dispersion of human capital as calibrated by application of standard models. See Zetterberg, 1992, Davis (1992) , Hibbs (1991) , Krueger and Summers (1987) and OECD (1996) .
spilling over to wage settlements in the competitive, traded goods sectors. 7 By the 1950's these objectives had taken strong institutional form and, as already noted, between 1956 and 1983 LO and SAF forged framework agreements specifying the wages of all private bluecollar workers.
The history of Swedish wage formation since the 1950's is usefully divided into three phases: Two phases of centralized, solidarity bargaining associated with the enormous compression of relative wages just reviewed, followed in the last dozen years by a regime of decentralized industry and local level bargaining during which wage dispersion rapidly escalated.
Phase I: Wage Leveling Between Industries and Plants
In the initial phase of solidarity bargaining, which dates from the first comprehensive The effects of Phase I central union pay policy may explain at least partly why wage levels across firms and industries in Sweden, by contrast to the United States and other countries with decentralized industrial relations, exhibit no "non-competitive" correlations with profitability, average productivity and capital intensity. Figure 2 presents 1983 data for Swedish industrial firms documenting the absence of any relation between net value added per worker (average productivity) and wage costs worker. 8 Figure 3 graphs the same sort of relation from a different angle for Sweden and the United States, with data aggregated to the industry-sectoral level after the underlying individual wages were purged of the effects of a broad set of human capital and working conditions variables. The Swedish wage premia exhibit no systematic relation to average productivity (or profitability), whereas in the United
States an inter-industry rent-sharing pattern is pronounced. 9 This evidence suggests that Phase I centralized solidarity bargaining may have helped create a national wage market more closely corresponding to the neoclassical competitive model than the pattern that seems to arise in decentralized wage formation systems, with or without the presence of trade unions. 8 Data assembled by the Swedish National Industrial Board (SIND) demonstrate that the profitability and productivity of Swedish enterprises were uncorrelated with average enterprise wage levels from the late 1960's through the early 1980's. This is what one would expect from the data in Figure 1 showing that nearly all of the great compression of inter-industry wage differentials took place between the early 1960's and early 1970's, leaving between industry wage dispersion flat until the breakdown of central bargaining in 1983. 9 See Katz and Summers, 1989 , for extended analysis of the well documented US pattern. 10 A comprehensive study by Teulings and Hartog, 1998 , shows that the implication of the Sweden-US contrast is quite general: The magnitude of of inter-industry and inter-firm wage differentials, and their sensitivity to product market conditions, falls internationally with the degree of centralization of wage formation. Non-compensating profit-and productivity-related wage premia obviously provide an incentive for labor to migrate out of stagnating sectors to expanding and efficient ones, at the cost of 'wage-taxing' profitable enterprises. But LO's Phase I wage policy could in principle achieve the same efficiency enhancing movements of labor (and capital) by squeezing such wage premia to nil, thereby depriving older or inherently unproductive enterprises of a cheap labor lifeline without imposing any relative wage tax on newer, more profitable ones. For this reason the policy has been interpreted theoretically as akin to an industrial policy that rewarded "sunrise industries" (Agell and Lommerud, 1993) which, if wage levels were sufficiently restrained in the expanding sectors, might have boosted industrial output as well as productivity growth (Moene and Wallerstein, 1997 Hibbs, 1991 , Jonsson and Siven, 1986 and Lindbeck, 1983 Although LO for the most part exercised leadership in the drive for wage leveling, the central private white collar union cartel, PTK, followed suit (especially the unions representing public sector white collar workers and lower echelon clerical employees), and probably for pretty much the same reason: During these years most Swedish trade union leaders and large numbers of their members shared a deep ideological commitment to equality.
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It is easy by appeal to economic first principles to identify unattractive consequences of union-imposed wage leveling that opens up large gaps between wage and marginal productivity distributions (See Flam, 1987, and Siven, 1987 for arguments oriented to Swedish experience), though, as noted in the introduction and expanded upon in part 3 ahead, "morale and cohesiveness" theories propose that within-firm wage compression may enhance productive efficiency Yellen, 1988, Levine, 1991 (Myrdal, 1991, p.196,198) 
Phase III: The Dissolution Of Central Bargaining
Whatever benefits in the form of wage restraint the dominant players in SAF got from Phase I solidarity policy were perceived by the mid-1970's as having been overwhelmed by union-imposed relative wage rigidity during an era of increasingly differentiated, "postFordist" industrial production. (de Geer, 1992 , Martin, 1984 and Pontusson and Swenson, 1996 , supply extended discussions.) Central bargaining was formally broken in 1983, when the employer's association for engineering and fabricated metals (Verkstadsföreningen), which includes such firms as Volvo, Saab-Scania and Asea, and accounts for one-third of the LO-SAF (private blue-collar) labor force, succeeded in prying the industry's blue and white collar unions away from their central organizations, by negotiating separate agreements. (See Ahlén, 1989 for details.) Appealing to distributional tensions within and between blue and whitecollar unions, the 1983 metal industry agreement provided for much wider wage differentials than previously, and in subsequent years strongly egalitarian rules for within-plant leveling of wages, the hallmark of Phase II solidarity wage policy, disappeared from industrial wage agreements.
After 1982 central influence on wages therefore began to dissolve and Sweden experienced a change of wage formation regime --from tri-level bargaining with powerful central coordination, to a system dominated by industry and firm-level bargaining. Although central 'wage frames' covering the whole private blue collar work force were negotiated by LO and SAF in 1985 and 1986-87 , the agreements were largely notional. Parties at industry negotiations were under no obligation to adhere to the distributional profiles of the frames, which in any event contained no 'low wage' rules for within-plant, inter-occupational leveling.
Traditional equality-oriented solidarity bargaining, which expired de facto in 1983, was terminated de jure in 1990 when the SAF Board of Directors simply shut down its bargaining unit. The devolution of power over wage setting to industry and local levels meant that central union authorities lost the institutional capacity to promote egalitarian wage policies. At the same time strong local and industrial unions, no longer constrained by central framework contracts, were free to exercise their market power in subnational bargaining. The ideas of "different pay for different work," extra compensation for the (high-skilled) "wrongly paid"
and earnings based on company profitability ("ability to pay") began to drive the wage formation process. Consequently, as Edin and Holmlund's (1995) empirical work shows, after 1983 a correlation began to arise between firm and industry wage levels and productivity and profitability.
The Phase III shift to decentralized bargaining arrangements is readily identified in the wage dispersion data graphed in Figure 1. (Also see the computations in Table 1 below.) 1983 marks the end of the decades long history of wage leveling. By the early 1990's the variance of relative wages among LO-SAF workers had risen by almost 50 percent from the 1983 trough, taking wage dispersion back to the levels of the early to mid-1970's. 14 All by itself this is persuasive evidence of the historical influence of centralized, solidarity bargaining arrangements on the structure of relative wages in Swedish industry; an interpretation that finds strong support in international analyses of institutional influences on wage dispersion.
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14 The data may understate the de-compression of the wage structure after 1983 as they do not include all remuneration in the form of bonus payments, profit-sharing, savings schemes and similar profit and productivity related earnings components introduced by employers after the erosion of central bargaining. 15 The most comprehensive international analysis (of the US and fifteen other advanced industrial countries) is by Wallerstein, forthcoming, who finds that centralization of wage formation is by far the most important institutional variable accounting for international differences in pay inequality. Blau and Kahn's (1996) study of the US and eight other countries, which calibrated the effects of supply and demand forces and the personal characteristics of workers, arrived at a similiar conclusion. 
Facts, Theories and Models
Trends in Swedish output and labor productivity growth over the last three to four decades conform at least superficially to the view that productive efficiency was, on balance, affected positively by wage dispersion trends associated with Phase I solidarity policy, but was impaired by dispersion trends under Phase II policy, especially during its later years. The cumulative growth paths of Swedish manufacturing output and labor productivity, deviated from the corresponding national and international average growth rates for the period, are Yet movements in labor and capital inputs to production, in average wage levels, in the cost of capital, and in other established determinants of output and productivity performance may be sufficient to account for the patterns, obviating the need to consider unconventional wage dispersion variables. We address this issue by estimation of distribution-augmented production and labor productivity functions. 
Predictions from Theory and Observation
In standard neoclassical theory, workers are emotionless commodities, conceptually equivalent to machines, whose notional marginal productivities are predetermined with respect to wages (and wage distributions). Positively, the theory asserts that factors of production in a competitive economy are, in equilibrium, paid their marginal revenue products. Normatively, the neoclassical tradition holds that factor payments should be equated to marginal productivities in order to sustain economic efficiency.
During the last decade such mainstream thinking has been challenged. Drawing on social exchange theory, equity theory and related thinking in sociology and social psychology, as well as on firm-level case studies and laboratory research by experimental psychologists, Akerlof
and Yellen argue that a policy of wage leveling within the firm may yield favorable effects on output and productivity. They begin by maintaining the empirical proposition that "workers regard a fair wage system as one with pay differentials which are more compressed than productivity differentials." Hence, "firms with less variance in their compensation will have more harmonious labor relations and thus achieve higher output per worker. ... effort increases as a consequence of the decrease in the variance of wages..." (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988, p.45,48 . Also see and Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) Similarly, Levine (1991. p.237) , perusing the same literature, devises theoretical demonstrations of the closely related hypothesis that "narrowing wage dispersion can increase cohesiveness, and in participatory firms cohesiveness can increase productivity."
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These notions lead Levine, Akerlof and Yellen and others to propose (firm-level) production functions of the form
where Q is real value added, Ef denotes within-firm, wage distribution-dependent labor effectiveness, L denotes labor inputs to production and it is postulated that Ef
Thus the firm's productivity depends positively on the effectiveness (cohesiveness, morale) of labor, and effectiveness depends negatively on wage dispersion. Accordingly, under "fairness" theory firms in principle have motivation to promote a distribution of wages more compressed than initial-condition marginal productivities.
It is clear from the Swedish historical record, however, that firms did not look favorably on the wage leveling associated with the Phase II period of Swedish wage formation which, as we showed before, drastically compressed within-plant, inter-occupational wage differentials.
(See section 2 and the studies there cited.) On the contrary, the Phase II wage compressions were promoted by a radicalized and powerful trade union movement that imposed egalitarian wage objectives ("equal pay for all work") on recalcitrant employers in central bargaining.
Moreover, the general presumption in the Swedish debate about Phase II LO wage policy is that Within plant (and industry) wage compression substantially distorted conventional microeconomic effort-reward incentives, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of labor inputs to production. And perhaps by intention from the unions' point of view, if equality of wage distribution was consciously traded-off against productive efficiency (and hence the sustainable rate of growth of average wages). This presumption may of course be wrong. Swedish firms might in fact have benefited from productivity enhancing "fairness" effects induced by 'Within' wage compressions forced on them by a powerful central trade union organization.
As noted earlier, Scandinavian theoretical work points to the influence of pay compression on industrial structure, rather than to the behavioral mechanisms featured in the Akerlof and Yellen and Levine stories, as the place to look for productivity-enhancing wage leveling 1 1 6 6 S Su uc ch h r re ea as so on ni in ng g c ca an n b be e t tr ra ac ce ed d b ba ac ck k a at t l le ea as st t t to o H Hi ic ck ks s ( (1 19 96 63 3, , a ap pp pe en nd di ix x, , p p. . 3 33 34 4) ) w wh ho o w wr ro ot te e: : " "T Th he e p pu ur re el ly y e ec co on no om mi ic c c co or rr re es sp po on nd de en nc ce e b be et tw we ee en n t th he e w wa ag ge e p pa ai id d t to o a a p pa ar rt ti ic cu ul la ar r w wo or rk ke er r a an nd d h hi is s v va al lu ue e t to o t th he e e em m p pl lo oy ye er r i is s n no ot t a a s su uf ff fi ic ci ie en nt t c co on nd di it ti io on n f fo or r e ef ff fi ic ci ie en nc cy y; ; i it t i is s a al ls so o n ne ec ce es ss sa ar ry y t th ha at t t th he er re e s sh ho ou ul ld d n no ot t b be e s st tr ro on ng g f fe ee el li in ng gs s o of f i in nj ju us st ti ic ce e a ab bo ou ut t t th he e r re el la at ti iv ve e t tr re ea at tm m e en nt 
where, as before, CV W 17 Though Akerloff and Yellen, like Levine, write mostly about relations within firms or workplaces, they occasionally also refer to industries ("...in industries where it is advantageous to pay some employees highly, it is considered fair [by employees] to also pay other employees well." 1988, p.44). Their reasoning therefore seems to imply
for wage data arrayed by industries as well as plants.
The conventional arguments of Lundberg (1985) and Jonsson and Siven (1986) However, because they believe that such improvements to labor productivity were achieved at the price of stagnating aggregate industrial output (in the same way that, say, a monetary policy led contraction may simultaneously raise labor productivity and lower output by driving the least productive firms into bankruptcy and the least productive workers out of employment), the wage compression effect claimed on industry-level output is negative.
18 Table 2 summarizes the predictions associated with the 'fairness', 'structural' and more 'conventional' views. 18 In other words, by this argument there will be 'survivor bias' of precisely the sort we want to pick up in aggregate regressions. Note also that the predictions of increased output from between plant and between industry wage leveling in the theoretical models of Agell and Lommerud and Moene and Wallerstein are conditional on union policy delivering real wage restraint in expanding sectors. Absent restraint, wage 
Industrial Production and Derived Labor Productivity Functions
As before let Ef denote wage distribution effects, let conventional inputs to production consist of blue collar labor hours, L, and the (real) capital stock net of depreciation, K, and let the rate of technological progress be indexed by an exponential trend.
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We entertain production functions for log industrial output net of intermediate inputs (log real value added) in the form of equation (1) distribution effects on both output and labor productivity are the same as those claimed by Jonsson and Siven, Lundberg and others holding the conventional view. 19 Swedish white-collar hours of labor input are measured with great imprecision and so we implicitly subsume them in specifications of trend. 20 0
Equation (3) is conditioned on the assumption of fixed productivity trend. In view of the world-wide productivity slowdown in the 1970s, which is correlated to some degree with the phases of Swedish wage formation discussed in section 2 (see Table 1 We assume also that aggregate labor demand is adequately characterized by quadratic adjustment costs of proportional quantities (see Hamermesh, 1993 , chapters 7 and 8 for a review of the topic) and, therefore, write
Further, because we believe tight specifications of output and optimal labor demand functions should not be taken literally (on this score, see Roemer's 1993 review essay, along with the associated comments and discussion), parameter constraints implied by strict application of (3)- (6) were not imposed when deriving labor productivity estimating equations. Hence (5) and (6) Note that distinctions drawn between dispersion effects on output and labor productivity in regression experiments based on (4) and (7) are somewhat arbitrary. The labor productivity models are derived for output given, so they are just rearrangements of conditional labor demand functions. Consequently, regression experiments based on (7) could just as well be interpreted as delivering the effects of wage dispersion on employment. Analagously, output production functions like (4) are indistinguishable from direct productivity equations obtained by subtracting ln L from both sides of (3), and so wage dispersion coefficients obtained in regressions based on them could be interpreted as estimating effects on productivity. As Gordon (1987) and Pehkonen (1995) , however, we want to condition productivity responses to wage distribution on real wage levels; therefore we also adopt the derived view of productivity.
Empirical Results
Regression models were fit to two time ranges --1964-1993 and 1972-1993 --which were determined by the availability of data available for calculation of Within and Between variance components of wages arrayed by plants or industries. (See Appendix 1, Record of Notation.) As we have seen, theory and opinion concerning potential responses of productive efficiency (Ef) to shifts in wage distribution (CV 2 ) lack consensus, even as to signs of effects, and provide no guidance about precise functional forms for empirical investigation.
Regression experiments were undertaken for two quite flexible specifications:
Table 3 reports estimates of the response of log industrial output to wage dispersions in regression experiments based on equations (3)-(4). Table 4 reports corresponding estimates for log labor productivity responses in regressions based on equations (7)- (8). Regression
Models (1)- (2) and (5)- (6) Models (3)- (4) and (7)- (8) in Tables 3 and 4 allow period shifts in output and productivity trends. Recall that the trend shift variables correspond exactly to the phases of Swedish wage formation discussed in 2, and therefore these specifications pose stringent baselines for estimation of dispersion effects, particularly given the relativley high covariation of the Within and Between dispersion variables and the modest sample sizes available for testing. 21 In fifteen of the sixteen regression experiments specified with multiple trends the estimated signs of the dispersion variables are the same as in the time invariant trend models: Between 21 Notwithstanding the difference in rates of Within and Between relative wage compression during Phases I and II of centralized bargaining (described in Section 2), the shared variance of Within and Between dispersions is about 80% in both the industry and plant samples. Given the relatively high collinearity, the pattern of significant effects reported in the Tables means that the wage inequality in Sweden was roughly equivalent to that in the United States (Edin and Topel, 1997) , and much of the Within plant (and industry) wage leveling took place following the radicalization of LO wage policy in 1969-70 (the beginning of the Phase II regime described earlier). In any case, no functional form we were able to devise (including specifications with lagged dispersion terms and parabolic forms allowing sign reversals, threshold effects and so on) managed to detect any positive output or productivity response to Agell and Lommerud (1993) , and Moene and Wallerstein (1997) .
Equalization of relative wages Between plants and industries evidently raised aggregate output and productivity significantly, most likely, as Edin and Topel's (1997) Notes: Bold coefficients for dispersion variables are significant at the 5% level; t-ratios in brackets; Estimation method is Instrumental Variables Least Squares with robust errors, where output (lnQ) is instrumented using log real imports for OECD countries (external demand for Swedish tradables) and lagged output; NS means coefficient not significant, very close to zero and hence omitted from specification reported; Definitions and sources of variables are given in the Appendix 1, Record of Notation.
Implications And Conclusions
What about the magnitudes of distribution effects on productive efficiency? We roughly calibrate the scale of effects implied by the regression evidence by applying the relevant coefficient estimates to observed changes in Within and Between variance components, which were then cumulated over the period studied: 4. ) Whatever the precise magnitudes, wage distribution-induced enhancements to productivity during Sweden's "golden 24 Taking averages is of course a somewhat arbitrary way of summarizing the regression results. 25 Addison and Hirsch (1989) , supply an excellent review of the limitations of production function-based investigations like this one that try to assess the effects of outside 'union-related' variables on growth and productivity.
decade" from the early 1960's to the early 1970's, evidently were not achieved at the cost of lower aggregate output, as Lundberg (1985) and Jonsson and Siven (1986) , among others, asserted. 
